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The Way We Live Now: Rhetorical
Persuasion and Democratic
Conversation
by Eugene Garver'
Never was there, perhaps, more hollowness at heart than at present
... in the United States. Genuine belief seems to have left us.
Walt Whitman'

I.

WHAr'S NEW?

It would be ungrateful for me to argue with the questions I have been
invited to explore. But that is where I have to start. I have been asked
to address the followingWhat are the virtues required for our common life as citizens in a
democracy and for civil democratic conversation? How and why have
these virtues been eroded in our Republic as we enter the second
decade of the twenty-first century? What resources exist within
political thought and our American political tradition for confronting
this erosion?2

I want to quarrel with four presuppositions of my assignment. First,
I have no idea whether it is right or wrong to consider the United States
in isolation. Maybe our problems are global ones, and maybe they are

* Professor Emeritus, Saint John's University. University of Chicago (A.B. 1965; Ph.D.
1973).
1. WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS 11 (Ed Folsom ed., Univ. Of Iowa Press 2010).
2. See Purpose Statement, Mercer Law Review Symposium 2011, Citizenship and
Civility in a Divided Democracy: Political, Religious, and Legal Concerns, MERCER LAW
(Oct. 7,2011), http-//www.law.mercer.edu/content/1aw-review-symposium-2011 [hereinafter
Mercer Law Review Symposium Purpose Statement].
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uniquely American. I wonder how a Nigerian, an Israeli, or a Jamaican
would respond to those questions.
Second, there is the claim that the necessary virtues have been eroded.
It is hard to evaluate such claims and hard to know whether they are
meant to be evaluated. Nothing of practical value can come of judgments that our current situation is worse than some past era or
historical norm. Yes, many Republicans today deny the legitimacy of
President Obama, and President Clinton before him, but many
Democrats once denied the legitimacy of President Lincoln, with
somewhat bloodier consequences. Whether virtues have eroded or not
is really beside the point. The point is that things are bad enough, and
it would be good to think they could be improved.'
Third, even if the virtues have been eroded, it does not follow that
restoration is the solution. The circumstances to which virtue should be
responsive have changed, and so should the virtues. Our problems are
our problems, not problems that people in the past have already solved
for us. Instead of asking how to recover lost virtue, we should ask about
the virtues we need now.
The fourth and final point will be my subject. It is the word "and" in
the first sentence. Are the virtues required for our common life as
citizens in a democracy the same as the virtues we need for civil

3. Because I have no idea whether the problems we are talking about are specific to the
United States, I will not consider all the possible institutional factors that might structure
our problems in particular ways. Aristotle himself says that he has to include considerations of style and delivery in the art of rhetoric because of the depravity of the
constitution. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC bk. III, at 215-82 (George A. Kennedy trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1991). For details, see, inter alia, SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE

THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). Steven Smith in discussion suggested that the turn
to the Supreme Court in the 1950s led to a turn to rights, which in turn has led to more
uncompromising rhetoric.
4. It has been more than forty years since Richard Hofstadter described current
American political discourse:
American politics has often been an arena for angry minds. In recent years we
have seen angry minds at work mainly among extreme right-wingers, who have
now demonstrated in the Goldwater movement how much political leverage can
be got out of the animosities and passions of a small minority. But behind this I
believe there is a style of mind that is far from new and that is not necessarily
right-wing. I call it the paranoid style simply because no other word adequately
evokes the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial
fantasy that I have in mind.
Richard Hofstadter, The ParanoidStyle in American Politics,HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1964,
It is hard to reread
at 77, available at http://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/0014706.
Hofstadter's essay and not ask, "What's new?" One plausible answer is: now they are
wunng.
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democratic conversation? Many past worries about similar concerns
were framed as questions about the relation between virtue and
eloquence, between the virtues of practice, action, and character, and the
virtues or skills of fluent and persuasive speech. I will draw on those
traditions.
In one of the most permanently stimulating and least influential lines
of response, Plato's Dialogues' draw extensive connections between the
courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom of a good conversationalist and
of a good person. Socrates insists that if one cannot truly talk about a
virtue, then one does not really possess the virtue-you can not be a lover
except through being able to talk about love,' and you can not be a good
politician without being able to give an account of what one is doing.'
From knowing the good, good action will follow immediately and so will
truthful and trustworthy speaking.
A more popular line of thought has Cicero as its champion. Drawing
on a tradition that extends back at least to Socrates and forward into
the civic humanism of the Renaissance, Cicero talks about the union of
wisdom and eloquence.' This line of thought sees the great crisis of
philosophy and common life as the separation of the eloquence from
wisdom, which Cicero blames on Socrates for making wisdom so difficult
that people had to specialize in one or the other.' Cicero's diagnosis
continues in more modern variants in the idea that "the deterioration of
the political conversation . . . is exacerbated by the corruption of the
political conversation through its effective displacement by the administration of economics."10 We face the same problem as Cicero: how to
come to practical decisions through the use of practical intelligence
against the looming background of an expertise that can always make
civic discourse look naive, misinformed, out of date, and immature.
A third tradition denies any connection between practical wisdom and
eloquence, and even sees them as contrary powers. So much of the
success of modernity has come from denying the place of rhetorical
excellence and from seeing democracy and eloquence as opponents, that
it is surprising to see this conference placing the corruption of conversa-

5. PLATO, THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., Princeton Univ. Press 11th prtg. 1982).
6. See 3 PLATO, Lysis, in LYsis, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAs (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 2001); 3 PLATO, Symposium, in LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS (W.R.M. Lamb
trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
7. See PLATO, The Apology, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 43 (Hugh Tredennick
trans., Penguin Books 1984).
8. See generally CICERO, DE ORATORE (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1960).
9. Id. at 153-57.
10. Merver Law Review Symposium Purpose Statement, supra note 2.
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tion at the center of more general political degradation."
When
Machiavelli, for example, says that states are secure because of good
laws and good arms, but good laws are impossible without good arms, he
shifts the focus of attention from eloquence to the cunning uses of force
as the effective truth.12 The frontispiece to Leviathana illustrates the
artificial chains between the lips of the sovereign and the ears of the
people, so that they can only hear what the sovereign says on their
behalf; peace requires silence, not eloquence.' Machiavelli and Hobbes
were not proponents of democracy, but many advocates of democracy
have followed their lead.
The assumption that the conditions of political conversation and of
politics are related, or maybe even the same, is the source of the idea
that "the deterioration of the political conversation [is] a central problem
faced by our Republic today."" If one thought that the quality of
discourse had no correlation with, and did not causally contribute to, the
quality of the way we treat each other (our practical virtues) then we
would not take that deterioration of the political conversation so
seriously. There are all sorts of incivility, and not all of them need be
politically troublesome. I used to teach in a coat and tie and call my
students by their last names. I regret the loss of formality, and with it
a form of courtesy, but this decline does not necessarily have any
political significance. Cell phones have caused a great deal of incivility,
but that is because we have not yet settled on rules of decorum.
In fact, I think that the deterioration, or at least the poor quality, of
our political conversation comes from its lack of connection to action.
Our political conversation is literally irresponsible, detached from actual
problems. It represents a flight from a reality too hard to think about.
The less that is actually at stake in our disagreements, the more uncivil
they become, because they are about nothing but the pride-and nothing
less than the identity-of the participants. That is, they are about
nothing and yet everything is at stake. Oppositions are non-negotiable

11. See generally BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND
JUDGMENT (2006).
12. See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Harvey C. Mansfield trans.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998).
13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshotte ed., Oxford 1957).
14. See generally id. As Jeff Walker reminds me, this point is perhaps first made by
Tacitus in his A Dialogue on Oratory. TACITUS, A Dialogueon Oratory,in THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF TACITUS 735 (Alfred Moses Hadas ed., John Church & William Jackson Brodribb
trans., Random House 1942).

15. Mercer Law Review Symposium PurposeStatement, supra note 2.
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but at the same time too high and too low not only for practical
compromise but for continuing conversation.16
There are issues that divide us on which all parties feel that a lot is
at stake. But there is a large set of issues that contain an asymmetry
invisible when we talk about "the fact of pluralism" or about deep
disagreements, or when speakers demonstrate their objectivity and
fairness through the appearance of balance. I do not feel the need to
pray five times a day, but I certainly do not have a need not to pray five
times a day. To some, recycling is an obligation or a virtue; no one
thinks that they have a duty to create as much waste as possible, except
as a way of showing contempt for those who do practice it. While Pat
Robertson has alerted people that we might be eating Halal meat
without knowing it, I will not be polluted by such meat and cannot see
why anyone would object apart from the fact that the wrong people
would win that way. One side sees everything at stake, and the other
cannot see what the fuss is about. Sometimes one sort of identity
politics is met by a contrary identity, but more often by puzzlement
about what is so important here: what do women-or blacks, or francophones in Quebec, or Zulus in South Africa-really want? We need new
virtues beyond the toleration that relies on indifference. What one
person regards as central to her identity, another sees as a trivial
irrigation. Christians do not have any obligations to dress in a certain
way; how important can it be to Jews to wear yarmulkes? Surely not as
17
important as military uniformity.

16. Hume stated that:
Nothing is more usual than to see parties, which have begun upon a real
difference, continue even after that difference is lost. When men are once inlisted
on opposite sides, they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are
united, and an animosity against their antagonists: And these passions they often
transmit to their posterity.
DAVID HUME, Of Parties in General, in ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 3, 56-57
(Cosimo 2006). Part of the continuation of Hume's essay is worth quoting here:
The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco between the Blacks and
Whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant
difference. We laugh at them; but, I believe, were things rightly examined, we
afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For, what are all the wars of
religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They
are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of
complexion is a sensible and a real difference; but the controversy about an article
of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference in
sentiment, but in a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of,
without understanding them, and the other refuses in the same manner.
Id. at 57.
17. For a legal example, consider Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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One person who did notice this asymmetry was Richard Rorty, who
notoriously thought that the response most suited to democracy was for
us to get you to see how unimportant those beliefs are. Rorty's plan was

that we treat others as though they were as thick-skinned as we think
ourselves to be.18 At least Rorty knew that he was being offensive.
That is more attractive to me than the Rawlsian idea that since I am
able to put my deepest convictions aside, it is only fair that you do the
same.19 It takes new forms of moral imagination to see something as
crucial to one person yet vanishingly unimportant to another. Rorty's
proposal puts each individual in the position formerly reserved for the
sovereign, to tolerate error through a virtue not of indifference but of
condescension. The challenge is to do better.
Today we need virtues of equality in new ways. One hundred and fifty
years ago, Mill prophetically formulated our new need for virtue in The

Subjection of Women:20
In the less advanced states of society, people hardly recognize any
relation with their equals.

To be an equal is to be an enemy ....

[wiherever he does not command he must obey. Existing moralities,
accordingly, are mainly fitted to a relation of command and obedience.
Yet command and obedience are but unfortunate necessities of human
life: society in equality is its normal state.21
Mill's remark not only points to the need for a new form of virtue, but
it does quite a lot to explain the relation between the need for new

18. Richard Rorty, The PriorityofDemocracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE
FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 257, 272 (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughn eds., 1988)
("Moral commitment, after all, does not require taking seriously all the matters that are,
for moral reasons, taken seriously by one's fellow citizens. It may require just the opposite.
It may require trying to josh them out of the habit of taking those topics so seriously.
There may be serious reasons for so joshing them. More generally, we should not assume
that the aesthetic is always the enemy of the moral. I should argue that in the recent
history of liberal societies, the willingness to view matters aesthetically-to be content to
indulge in what Schiller called 'play' and to discard what Nietzsche called 'the spirit of
seriousness'-has been an important vehicle of moral progress."). Contra ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 72 (1993) ("[T]he

sort of imaginative sympathy that deliberation requires combines two opposite-seeming
dispositions, that of compassion, on the one hand, and that of detachment, on the other
.... It is difficult to be compassionate, and often just as difficult to be detached, but what
is most difficult of all is to be both at once.").
19.

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).

20. JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women, in THREE ESSAYS 427 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1975).
21. Id. at 477; see THOMAS HOBBES, THE CITIZEN 106 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed.,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1949) ("[Elach man is an enemy to that other whom he
neither obeys nor commands.").
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virtues and the sad quality of contemporary political discourse, or the
relation between wisdom and eloquence. I think that a lot of contemporary anxiety consists of the difficulties of making the adjustment to a
"more advanced state of society" in which people recognize each other as
equals. Incivility is often a response to others treating you as an equal
when you regard yourself as superior, in experience, knowledge, status,
or authority. Equal behavior towards others is often regarded as uncivil
behavior, failure to show proper deference. People insecure about their
station in life take any disagreement as insult. It is only polite to agree.
As Mill observes in On Liberty," what is taken to be incivility is often
a strategy of the weak to gain a hearing.
If political conversation unrestrained by reality and by the need for
agreement comes in part from this lack of the virtue of equality, it
makes sense that political discourse would be most outrageous when so
little is at stake. Over the years, there has been a strong negative
correlation between accusations of "class-warfare" and the height of the
top marginal tax rate. In other words, the less the wealthy pay in taxes,
and the more economic inequality there is, the more any discussion of
these injustices stimulates cries of class-warfare. The less that is at
stake, the shriller the rhetoric. People who come so close to total victory
resent any irritant that prevents them from enjoying their triumph by
seeing others acknowledge that they deserve it."
Rorty's solution is to invite fundamentalists to hold their beliefs
without the emotional commitments that prevent him from conversing
with them."
The opposite strategy, that we hold our beliefs as
absolute commitments and fight for them, seems to be what caused the
wars of religion whose memory still affects our thinking on the nature
of political conversation, especially because many do not regard the wars
of religion as merely a memory. If that is the only alternative, then sign
me up for Rorty's team. I think the real virtue here is to treat with
respect people whose attitude one finds overwrought, to treat seriously
opinions one knows to be false. Toleration used to be a gracious act of
the powerful against their inferiors. Whether the attitude I am talking
about should be seen as tolerance or not, it does not rely on a permanent

22. JoHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975).
23. See id. Martin Luther King's Letter from the Birmingham Jail is a classic
exposition of the value of incivility. See Martin Luther King, Jr., The Negro Is Your
Brother,THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 1963, at 78. The anonymity of the Internet is often a device
for presuming equality. "Who are you to speak to or about me like that, and get away with
it?"
24. David Lyons's comments at the symposium expand this point nicely. See David
Lyons, Violence and PoliticalIncivility, 63 MERCER L. REV. 835 (2012).
25. See Rorty, supra note 18.
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inequality, but on local asymmetries between how each regards her own
opinions and how she treats others. We want our own opinions to be
true, while we do not apply that standard to others. Hence the
temptation to condescension.
Contrary to what Socrates suggests in the Euthyphro,2 6 there is no
set of issues disagreement on which produces enmity and hatred.
Socrates distinguished such questions from matters where we can simply
calculate a solution.2 7 But being subject to calculation does not stop an
issue-the age of the earth, whether abstinence only policies reduce teen
pregnancy-from heated and unending controversy.2 8 Multiinguism can
be simply a fact of life in some countries, and cause of civil war or
partition in others. If it is the case that American political conversation
is heated and ill-mannered as never before, it certainly is not because
our politicians are more distant from each other on the issues than ever
before. Freud's definition of nationalism as narcissism over minor
differences rings true as an account of current American politics.2
Political discourse, I have been claiming, is inconsequential (without
a ,connection to action) and, therefore, irresponsible without any
commitment by speakers to what they say. Because of the irresponsibility that comes from the lack of connection between discourse and action,
our political conversation is purely strategic and designed for effect.'o
Hobbes describes the emotional correlative this way: "VAIN-GLORY:
which name is properly given; because a well grounded confidence
begetteth attempt; whereas the supposing of power does not, and is
therefore rightly called Vain."" People speak the way they do because
they know that they cannot be called on to act out their opinions.

26. PLATO, EUTHYPHRO, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATEs 17 (Hugh Tredennick trans.,
Penguin Books 1984).
27. See generally id.
28. See HOBBES, supra note 21, at 76. "There is scarce any principle, neither in the
worship of God, nor human sciences, from whence there may not spring dissensions,
discords, reproaches, and by degrees war itself. Neither doth this happen by reason of the
falsehood of the principle, but of the disposition of men, who, seeming wise to themselves,
will needs appear such to all others." Id.
29. See Sigmund Freud, On Narcissism: An Introduction, in ESSENTIAL PAPERS ON
NARCISSISM 17 (Andrew P. Morrison ed., 1986).
30. Controversies over posting copies of the Ten Commandments in public places is, for
me, a paradigm. See Eugene Garver, The Ten Commandments: Powerful Symbols and
Symbols of Power, 3 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMANITIEs 205 (2007); Religious Symbolism
and Moral Distinctiveness,in MONOTHEISM & ETHICS (Y. Tzvi Langermann, ed. 2011). For
the strategic uses of language and their pathologies, see J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND
COMMUNITY (1984).

31.

See HOBBES, supra note 13, at 36.
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Our political conversation is perfectly diagnosed by R. G. Collingwood
in The New Leviathan,2 except that he thinks he is describing academic discourse. What might once have been a more restricted pathology is
now epidemic:
One chief pursuit of the immature animal, human or other, is to
prepare itself for the dangers of real life, while its elders are protecting
it from them, by making believe to face them; and this is the greater
part of education; so that the office of universities in a commonwealth
is to provide an unfailing flow of insignificant speech .... For speech
is man's weapon against the dangers of his own world, and insignificant speech is what he teaches his cubs as his fellow creatures teach
theirs to bat without clawing and nip without biting.'
Partisans interpreting the statements of opponents as threats of
violence, as noted in the Symposium's Statement of Purpose,' exemplify Collingwood's claim. What he calls immaturity is more precisely an
expression of impotence. Our political conversation is not about
anything real because reality lies beyond our political conversation.'
Our world is changing, and we do not know how to handle new
problems, so let us argue about abortion, gay marriage, or creationism
instead. It is not enough to blame dealers in fantasy from Phyllis
Schaffley through Grover Nordquist, the swift boat people, death
panelists, the birthers, global warming deniers, people lying about the
Ground Zero Mosque, and those who will defend America by forbidding
the use of Sharia law, for poisoning American political conversation.
The question is why magical thinking should find such a responsive
audience.
As in ancient Athenian democracy, political argument is conducted by
elites who nominate themselves to speak for the people. They succeed

32. R. G. COLLINGWOOD, THE NEW LEVIATHAN, OR MAN, SOCIETY, CIVILIZATION, AND
BARBARISM (1947).
33. Id. TT 2.52-2.53, at 12. Here, Collingwood is reenacting what Vico called the
barbarism of reflection: "[S] uch peoples [in the barbarism], like so many beasts, have fallen
into the custom of each man thinking only of his own private interests and have reached
the extreme delicacy, or better of pride, in which like wild animals they bristle and lash
out at the slightest displeasure." GIAMArIsTA VIco, THE NEw SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA
VICO 11106, at 423-24 (Thomas Goddard Bergin & Max Harold Fisch trans., Cornell Univ.
Press 1968).
34. Mercer Law Review Symposium Purpose Statement, supra note 2.
35. Hobbes offers a different, but plausible, interpretation: "[I]rrational creatures
cannot distinguish betweene injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease,
they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he
is most at ease. . . ." HOBBES, supra note 13 at 111. That is, it is a luxury to be able to
engage in empty rhetoric.
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when the people imitate elite speech and take it as authentically their
own. How else can we explain why normal American citizens will talk
about "political correctness" or "socialized medicine" and use what
Hotspur called "many holiday and lady terms"?" It is an oddity of
contemporary political debate that the most demagogic language is also
the most elite.
I doubt that this is the first time in history that people have felt too
lost to be able to deliberate and to think that they can use reason
practically. Machiavelli wrote The Prince" to respond to just such a
situation of instability where the virtues have been eroded, and where
"the deterioration of the political conversation . .. is exacerbated by the
corruption of the political conversation through its effective displacement
by" the use of mercenaries who destroyed the opportunities for patriotic
virtue." Machiavelli did not have to worry about the invasion of
foreign law, religion, and culture; he had to be concerned with the
invasion of foreign soldiers and princes.
To articulate what I think is going on, I want to look in some detail at
classical rhetoric for a better understanding of the relations between
eloquence and practical wisdom. Classical rhetoric not only has the
advantage over other treatments that it makes the relation between
"political conversation" and political action central, but it also has the
traditional advantage over philosophy that rhetoric is by design
superficial and does not require epistemological or metaphysical
arguments. It is discourse that aims at a judgment." After exploring
some features of Aristotle's On Rhetoric,4 0 I will turn to a slightly more
detailed look at The Prince,which will give an example of a great mind
responding to a challenge similar to the one we face today.

36. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRsT PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, act 1, sc. 3,
line 46. The Mercer Law Review Symposium included a discussion of a situation modeled
on that of Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). One of the
striking things about Vicky Frost in that case was her need to use the language of elites
in order to name the manifestations of the devil, such as secular humanism, individualism,
and scientism. See id. at 1061-62.
37. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12.
38. Mercer Law Review Symposium Purpose Statement, supra note 2.
39. As will become apparent, I think that the treatment of these issues that comes
closest to my own is the work of Paul Kahn. But where Kahn sees the opposition between
reason and will as generating our political problems, I prefer to stay with kinds of
discourse, and more specifically kinds of persuasion, with different relations between
speaker and audience.
40. ARIsTOTLE, ON RHETORIC (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
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ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ARGUMENT

What is "persuasive is [what is] persuasive to someone."' That might
sound too obvious to be worth saying, but persuasive speaking differs
from other forms of thought and expression on exactly this point.
Rhetoric is the art of converting reasons into reasons for some particular
audience.4 2 The new virtues demanded by contemporary condition are
virtues of understanding someone else's reasons without those considerations becoming reasons for me. Someone else's reasons remain
notional, not real, possibilities, to use the distinction Bernard Williams
took from John Henry Newman.' One of the tasks for practical reason
is to see how reasons move back and forth between being personal and
being impersonal, as well as between real and notional."' I can
recognize something as a reason without acknowledging it as a reason
for me to act. To recall that what is "persuasive is persuasive to
someone'" 5 forces a certain humility on speakers and hearers as they
recognize that something can be a good reason for some without being
a good reason for all. The more we think that a good reason has to be
a reason for anyone, the less we will be able to practice the virtues of
practical possibility and necessity."6
I have gestured towards three strands of argument about the relation
between practical wisdom and eloquence: (1) the Platonic identification
of virtue with knowledge, and knowledge with the ability to engage in
certain kinds of speech; (2) the rhetorical tradition in which education
in eloquence is training for citizenship; and (3) the anti-rhetorical
tradition of the beginning of liberalism and democracy, which tried to

41. Id. bk. I, at 41.
42. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that "[dlemocracy and rhetoric share a trust in
argument." Jack L. Sammons,A Rhetorician'sView ofReligious Speech in CivicArgument,
32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 367, 367 (2009). On the other hand, Aristotle sees no particular
connection between democracy and deliberation, against the recent popularity of
"deliberative democracy."
43. See Bernard Williams, The Truth in Relativism, 75 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 215, 215-28 (1974-1975); JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, AN ESSAY IN AID
OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT (Ian Ker ed., 1985).

44. Williams talks about real and notional possibilities, not real and notional reasons.
See Williams, supra note 43. Newman speaks about real and notional assent. See
Newman, supra note 43.
45. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I, at 41.
46. For example, part of Hobbes's rhetorical strategy in Leviathan is to change the
horizons of the possible and the necessary, so that fear of death dominates each person's
mind without thoughts about the afterlife. See HOBBES, supra note 13.
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marginalize eloquence to build community. Aristotle's Ethics,"' Politics," and Rhetoric offers a fourth.
Aristotle asserts that there are three kinds of rhetoric-deliberative,
forensic or judicial, and epideictic or demonstrative-aiming respectively
at future advantages, at justice or injustice, guilt or innocence for past
acts, or at a celebration of present and timeless values. 49 Each of the
three kinds of rhetoric has become distorted in current political
discourse. None is an art in the sense that Aristotle meant because they
are not part of a single art. When that happens, phronsis, virtue of
practical wisdom or prudence, becomes cleverness: means-ends reasoning
might become the reasoning of experts, with ends appearing only as data
or side-constraints, but the celebration of ends in epideixis becomes
strategic. Phronsis makes decisions about means within the person
who also possesses the virtues of character. When the art of rhetoric is
dissolved into its genres, character is no longer available to hold it
together. Then the deliberative consideration of means becomes distinct
from the epideictic exposition of ends. From being kinds of rhetoric,
deliberation, judicial arguments about injustice and guilt, and demonstrative appeals have each become comprehensive styles of political
thought and modes of political imagination."o
Aristotle could offer a simple diagnosis of the condition of our political
conversation. We are speakers and listeners of epideictic rhetoric when
deliberative rhetoric is what we think we need. The asymmetries of our
political conversation make sense in terms of the kinds of rhetoric.
Deliberation is the activity of means-ends calculation. Its calculations
work best when nothing is sacred, so that the agent can look for the
easiest and best means." Deliberation then employs the low emotional
temperature of the plain style. Epideictic rhetoric, by contrast, finds the
act of declaring one's ends, and demonstrating one's fidelity to them, a
self-sufficient act. Here we see at its maximum faith in the power of
language. Therefore, this form of rhetoric will be seen as sacred, as
beyond empirical confirmation or refutation, not to be sullied by
compromise, a variety of acts that deliberative rhetoric would treat only
instrumentally. The Constitution, for example, is either a device for
47. ARISTOTLE, NIcoMAcHEAN ETmIcs (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
48. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1959).
49. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I, at 48.
50. I was immensely pleased to be able to present this paper at an institution that has
a Phronesis Project.
51.

See KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 35

(Samuel Moore trans., Foreign Language Press 4th prtg. 1972). "All that is solid melts into
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind." Id.
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allowing people to affect their purposes in a context of stability and
prosperity, or it is an object of veneration and worship. It is hard for it
to be both. The pragmatic deliberator will seem comparatively weak,
unprincipled, and eager to compromise, while the practitioner of
epideictic rhetoric will insist on maintaining the purity of her vision. In
the exchange of epithets, the politics of deliberation will accuse the
epideictic partisan of irrationality and unreality; the epideictic politics
will return the favor by seeing the open-minded deliberator as cosmopolitan and, thus, un-American.52

A.

Deliberation

The failures of deliberation account for the disproportionate power of
display rhetoric today. We do deliberate as a society and come to
collective decisions, but frequently are unable to imagine solving our
problems through reasoning. There are good reasons-I will list four-for
such a failure of imagination. In the first place, the scope of deliberation, and so of practical reasoning, has become ambiguous. When
Aristotle discusses deliberation in the Ethics, he says that we deliberate
about things that can change through our efforts, as opposed to things
that always happen the same way, and those that happen by chance like
"the finding of treasure."
There is no deliberation about what is
necessary and known through science." Part of our problem today is
that it is hard to find things that fall in between chance and necessity.
There are no more natural disasters; Amartya Sen argues that famine
is always a product of failed political decisions, not an act of nature.5 5

52. Professor Sammons claims that to exclude certain opinions "is something rhetoric
would never permit on any terms other than its own." Sammons, supra note 42, at 371.
One function of judicial rhetoric is to place certain opinions, and certain modes of
reasoning, out of bounds.
53. ARISToTLE, supra note 47, bk. III, at 42.
54. Id. at 43 ("There is no deliberation about precise and self-sufficient sciences. . .
ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I, at 41 ("[Rhetoric] is concerned with the sort of things ...
for which we do not have [other] arts.") (alteration in original).
55. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION (1997); BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY 128 (1993).
Modern liberal thought rejects all necessary social identities, but it is not this
element in its outlook that distinguishes its attitude to slavery from that of most
ancient Greeks. With regard to slavery, as opposed to their attitudes towards
women, two concepts particularly governed their thoughts: economic or cultural
necessity and individual back luck. Obviously we do not apply those concepts, as
the Greeks did, in such a way that we accept slavery. But we do apply those
concepts very extensively to our social experience, and they are still hard at work
in the modern world. The real difference in these respects between modern liberal
ideas and the outlook of most Greeks lies rather in this, that liberalism
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Given the complexities of modern bureaucratic and technological reality,
we cannot deliberate because we cannot see a connection between what
we want to happen and what is in our power to do. Dewey makes the
point perfectly:
The conditions that generate insecurity for the many no longer spring
from nature. They are found in institutions and arrangements that are
within deliberate human control. Surely this change marks one of the
greatest revolutions that has taken place in all human history.
Because of it, insecurity is not now the motive to work and sacrifice but
to despair. 6
Cheap and irresponsible political talk is a way of hiding from the fact
that we often have no idea what to do. Name an economic problem and
cutting taxes is the solution; name a security problem and the Strategic
Defense Initiative is the solution. Machiavelli notes in Chapter 25 of
The Prince that there are situations where fortune seems to control our
lives. His advice is as follows: If you have no idea what to do, boldness
and aggression is a better strategy than caution-this is the famous
advice to treat fortune like a woman." Today, it is the following: When
in doubt, cut taxes, especially on the deserving rich.
There is a second way in which we cannot mark off the scope of
deliberation. "We do not deliberate even about all human affairs; no
Spartan, for example, would deliberate about the best form of government for the Scythians. The reason is that we could not bring about any
of these things." As every parent learns, one simply cannot deliberate
for someone else. We are constantly discovering that what we thought
was Spartan turned out to be Scythian. Think of the American redesign
of the Iraqi flag. We do not know whether we can deliberate about
Libya or Sudan. Earlier I wondered whether the problems cited in my
charge were uniquely American. This is perhaps one dimension which
is.
Third, sometimes we do in fact know what to do. And then political
discourse has the opposite problem. Economic calculation and the
administrative state give us a body of expert knowledge that removes
the need for deliberation. Why deliberate when there is actual
knowledge to be had? Expertise makes ethical virtue unnecessary, just
as modern science displaces religion. Who needs the virtue of courage
demands-more realistically speaking, it hopes-that those concepts, necessity and
luck, should not take the place of considerations of justice.
Id.
56. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL AcTION 60(1935).
57. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12, at 98-99.
58. ARISTOTLE, supra note 47, at 42.
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when we have B-52s and unmanned drones that can destroy the enemy
without risk to our own soldiers? Who needs courage when we can plant
IEDs at the roadside and disappear before the enemy approaches? Who
needs Aristotle's virtue of wittiness when we have political consultants
who can tell us how to display a winning sense of humor, or a virtue of
justice when we can specify rules and hire disinterested bureaucrats to
enforce them? In the first book of the Politics,Aristotle speculates that
if each tool and machine could accomplish its own work without a hand
to guide it, then slavery would be unnecessary-if we have techniques for
accomplishing our purposes, then virtues are unnecessary." More
precisely, the virtues we have traditionally relied on are unnecessary.
This growth in expertise makes deliberation problematic in a final
way. Aristotle models practical deliberation on solving a geometry
problem. We cannot model practical deliberation on scientific reasoning
today because science is too complex to be a model for means-ends
reasoning. 60 Many others have claimed that Aristotle's practical
reasoning and virtue must be transformed today because we do not live
in his teleological cosmos with its "metaphysical biology." I am not
persuaded of that, but practical wisdom and virtue must be different
once this easy connection between scientific reasoning and means-ends
calculation is severed. We do not know what to deliberate about, or
when to deliberate, and we do not know how.

B. Epideictic Rhetoric
Without deliberation, it makes sense that our political rhetoric has
become epideictic or demonstrative. If our political speech cannot
change the world, maybe it can change us." Deliberation posits an end

59. See ARISTOLE, supra note 48, bk. I, at 12-21. ("[Flor if every tool could perform its
own work when ordered, or by seeing what to do in advance, like the statues of Daedalus
in the story, or the tripods of Hephaestus which the poet says 'enter self-moved the
company divine,'-if thus shuttles wove and quills played harps of themselves, mastercraftsmen would have no need of assistants and masters no need of slaves.").
60. Dewey seems over-optimistic here, and it is not surprising that this is a side of
Dewey that Rorty puts off to the side.
The very heart of political democracy is adjudication of social differences by
discussion and exchange of views. This method provides a rough approximation
to the method of effecting change by means of experimental inquiry and test: the
scientific method. The very foundation of the democratic procedure is dependence
upon experimental production of social change; an experimentation directed by
working principles that are tested and developed in the very process of being tried
out in action.
JoHN DEWEY, PROBLEMS OF 1VIEN 157 (1946).
61. I claim that in current circumstances, the difficulties or failures of deliberation
make epideictic rhetoric into a fall-back position. I am not implying that more generally
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and searches for means that will bring it about; epideictic rhetoric
celebrates the ends, and can sometimes let discourse serve as a
substitute for action rather than a preparation for it. Epideictic rhetoric
states who the speaker is and what she stands for, and asks that the
audience stand with her. The identity of a community, the subject of
epideictic rhetoric, consists in those practical possibilities and necessities
the community sees as real, the reasons we take as reasons for us.62
We can understand a community from the outside as we take those
possibilities and necessities as notional. We improve our political
conversation when we present our identity and when we understand
someone else's identity, in terms of notional possibilities and necessities
instead of taking what is different and distinctive about a community as
unintelligible and irrational.
What were for Aristotle two species of the art of rhetoric have become
two distinct forms of the political imagination, each comprehensive and
so without room for the other. We can conceive of politics as collective

problem solving or as the expression of meaning. The trouble with
pragmatic politics is that it narrowly focuses on what is true, regardless
of what harm it does to other values. The corresponding danger of
symbolic politics is that it refuses to separate truth from what it is

deliberation is harder than praise and blame. And one can find the opposite movement as
well: the celebration of symbols that makes them into objects of utility. Consider justifications the United States Supreme Court has made for public nativity scenes on the grounds
that they stimulate holiday shopping.
THAT THE SOUL EXPENDS ITS PASSIONS UPON FALSE OBJECTS, WHERE
THE TRUE ARE WANTING. . . [The soul, being transported and discomposed,
turns its violence upon itself, if not supplied with something to oppose it, and
therefore always requires an object at which to aim, and whereon to act. Plutarch
says of those who are delighted with little dogs and monkeys, that the amorous
part that is in us, for want of a legitimate object, rather than lie idle, does after
that manner forge and create one false and frivolous. And we see that the soul,
in its passions, inclines rather to deceive itself, by creating a false and fantastical
a subject, even contrary to its own belief, than not to have something to work
upon.
MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE vol. 2 (William Carew Hazilitt ed.,

Charles Cotton trans., 2006), availableat http-//www.gutenberg.org/dirs/3/5/8/3582/3582.txt.
[Tihese are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to, from their
disputing philosophically, instead of admiring, and adoring of the divine and
incomprehensible nature; whose attributes cannot signify what he is, but ought
to signify our desire to honour him, with the best appellations we can think on.
HOBBES, supra note 13, at 444.
62. In Chapter 8 of For the Sake ofArgument, I show how something can be a reason
for each of us without being a reason for us-that is, a public reason. See EUGENE GARVER,
FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENr. PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF
BELIEF 175 (2004).
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satisfying to believe." Evolutionary biology is true, but at what price?
Creationism and "intelligent design" make sense of the world and put
human beings at its center. The trouble with science is that it is
incompatible with the idea of being God's elect."
Pragmatic and symbolic politics are no longer genres of a single art of
rhetoric, but instead see themselves as all-consuming. Posting the Ten
Commandments is nonsense to the pragmatist. Empirical evidence that
abstinence only programs do not work will not move the citizen engaged
in symbolic politics. Liberal democracy tells itself the story of its
inevitable triumph over more primitive forms of living together, but the

63.

See ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY AND ITS RIVALS 31

(1994).
The reason why society must be based on falsehood is ... obvious. Truth is
independent of the social order and is at no one's service, and if not impeded will
end up by undermining respect for any given authority structure. Only ideas preselected or pre-invented and then frozen by ritual and sanctification can be relied
upon to sustain a specific organizational set-up. Free inquiry will undermine it.
Moreover, theories, as philosophers like to remind us, are under-determined by
facts. In other words, reason on its own will not and cannot engender that
consensus which underlies social order. The facts of the case, even if unambiguous (which they seldom are), will not engender a shared picture of the situation,
let alone shared aims .... The world in which men think seriously, and to which
serious thought refers, is no longer identical with the world in which one lives
one's daily life. The instability, contestability and often incomprehensibility of the
serious, respect-worthy kind of cognition, and hence of its objects, make it and
them altogether unsuitable to be the foundation of a stable, reliable social order,
or to constitute the milieu of life. The mechanisms underlying that cognitive and
technological-economic growth on which modern society depends for its legitimacy,
require pluralism among cognitive explorers as well as among producers, and it
is consequently incompatible with any imposition of a social consensus.
Id. at 31, 95.
64. See Ernest Gellner, Pragmatism and the Importance of Being Earnest, in
PRAGMATISM: ITS SOURCES AND PROSPECTS 43, 55-56 (Robert J. Mulvaney & Philip M.
Zeltner eds., 1981).
[Clonsider that mysterious entity we call truth .... It does not satisfy a wide
multiplicity of criteria but, on the contrary, a rather narrow range of them, or
perhaps even just a single criterion; and it is also conspicuously extrapolative....
[WIhat distinguishes the scientific thought style from pre-scientific ones is notably
the fact that instead of satisfying many criteria-including social cohesion,
authority-maintenance, morale, etc.-it sheds all but one aim, i.e., explanatory
power and congruence with facts. Moreover, far from adapting to one specific
environment-which is the only aim that natural selection can serve-it endeavors
to cover as wide a range of environments, of situations, as possible, and so to
speak to seek them out actively in the process of testing, rather than waiting till
they test it.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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periodic irruptions of symbolic politics should complicate the narrative
that constitutes its self-understanding.
We can always find someone to blame and exhibit that finding through
epideictic rhetoric. Unfortunately, although Aristotle says that deliberative and epideictic rhetoric differ only by a turn of phrase, we are
unable to convert praising and blaming into figuring out what to do."
If we can find someone to blame, we are satisfied and do not use that as
grounds to decide what to do next. We keep learning again the lesson
that the most powerful nation cannot move very smoothly from the
epideictic act of condemning human rights violations abroad to
deliberation about how to stop them. Rousseau's expression of forcing
people to be free is no longer a paradox.6 6 It is a maxim that organizes
American foreign policy. Earlier in American history, some people were
aware of the wrongness of slavery without either freeing their own
slaves or trying to abolish the institution. We can feel good about
ourselves by expressing the right values; political discourse becomes a
substitute for action rather than language that leads to action.
Where Aristotle assumed that we could easily translate back and forth
between deliberative and epideictic rhetoric, we need to turn our
attention to the conditions under which the smooth connection between
deliberation and epideixis can be accomplished; the conditions under
which deliberating towards a concrete end; and celebrating ultimate
ends are part of a single, continuous, practical, and discursive activity." Instead of that happy harmony we have a condition of what
Veblen called "trained incapacities": those who excel at the rhetoric of
policy are inept at the rhetoric of symbolism, and vice versa.
Part of the problem comes from a transformation in deliberative
rhetoric Aristotle could not have imagined: he said that in deliberation,
all one has to do is to prove that a given policy is in the interest of the

65. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I, at 83-87.
66. JEAN-JACQUEs ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT bk. I, at 27 (G.D.H. Cole trans.,
Prometheus Books 1988).
67. See JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 57-58 (1938). "Approach to
human problems in terms of moral blame and moral approbation, of wickedness or
righteousness, is probably the greatest single obstacle now existing to development of
competent methods in the field of social subject-matter." Id. at 495.
68. See THORSTEIN VEBLEU, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE INDUSTRIAL ARTs
347 (Cosimo 2006); see generallyBENEDICT DE SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE

27 (Jonathan Israel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) ("Those who are most powerful in
imagination are less good at merely understanding things; those who have trained and
powerful intellects have a more modest power of imagination and have it under better
control, reining it in, so to speak, and not confusing it with understanding.").
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audience.69 But citizens today frequently are persuaded and behave
against their own self-interest, incorporating symbolic values and not
simply utilities into their decisions about what to do. Persuasion, as I
said, converts some reasons into reasons for someone. Sometimes the
successful speaker can take the fact that something is a reason and
convince people that it should be a reason for them, even at the cost of
"rational self-interest."70
Epideictic rhetoric is adapted to the symbolic politics that interrupts
and distorts our more pragmatic political discourse. We need all three
kinds of rhetoric, but we get into trouble when we practice one but think
that we are practicing another. Symbolic politics always comes as a
surprise because it is never part of a coherent narrative, but tells its own
story by itself." Other kinds of rhetoric allow a distinction between the
argument and the facts represented. The other kinds of rhetoric draw
attention to the argument and evidence, but epideictic rhetoric is always
ambiguously turned both towards the subject of the speech and the
speaker's skill and dthos. For example, Lincoln's second inaugural
address exhibits the spirit of reconciliation it endorses." Epideictic
speeches are the statement of self-evident truths. In the sciences, selfevident truths might go without saying, but practically self-evident
truths need to be declared.7 ' They establish the conditions for their

69. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I.
70. This phenomenon may have first been identified by Hume in OfPartiesin General:
"Real factions may be divided into those from interest, from principle, and from affection.
Of all factions, the first are the most reasonable, and the most excusable." See HUME,
supra note 16, at 58. For more on this insight, see my article, Eugene Garver, Why
PluralismNow?, 73 THE MONIST, July 1990, at 388 (1990).
71. See PAuL W. KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: ADAM AND EVE AND THE PROBLEM OF EviL 170
(2007) ("A world built on symbols is simultaneously the strongest and the weakest of

constructions, for it both founds a universe and can disappear in an instant.").
72. See Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH
1989, at 142, 142-43 (1989).
73. See PAuL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND SOVEREIGNTY 116-17
(2011).
The sovereign is, as Lincoln explained, constituted by those who hold these truths
to be self-evident. This "holding forth" is not merely belief in their truth. Belief
that these are correct moral propositions is not bound by national borders. Liberal
states are in general agreement about the fundamental principles of a constitutional order. Such agreement by itself, however, does not constitute a political
community ....
Self-evidence moves in the dimension of the sacred, not the rational. We may
be convinced of the truth of many propositions, but they do not found a political
community. Even communities with substantially similar constitutions do not, for
that reason, become indistinguishable; they do not necessarily even become
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own felicitous performance. An ethically self-evident proposition does its
work in the act of speaking it and hearing it.7" In deliberative and
judicial rhetoric, the audience will decide for or against a particular
proposition-to go to war or not, to find someone guilty or not. But in
epideictic rhetoric, we cannot separate the conclusion from the rest of the
presentation and cannot separate reasoning from the language it is
presented in. Epideictic rhetoric can range beyond the constraints of
evidence to which deliberation is subject because it is self-contained like
a work of literature. The deliberative speaker has to know what he is
talking about, but one can praise or blame fictional beings and praise
one's enemy without endorsing his actions. Threats become anodyne,
and dangerous books become great books once their authors are safely
dead. Epideictic performances cannot neglect style, not because its
audiences are weak, but because the distinction between the body-the
enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, is the body of persuasion-and its
clothing cannot be drawn here." As self-contained, the epideictic
speech becomes a more organic body with its own internal standards for
success.
Because of the connection between epideictic rhetoric and literary
creations, epideixis has the advantage, and disadvantage, of being
political and practical discourse that is at the same time a form of
entertainment without responsibility to the community. Cleon criticizes
Athenian practice for assimilating political to epideictic rhetoric and
claims that Athenian citizens are theatai ton logon-spectators of
speeches." When Thucydides himself comments that words lose their
meaning, that loss is a movement from a language proportional to its
claims to a language in which there are rewards for being as extreme as
possible."

friends. The sacred is self-evident because there is no test of its truth apart from
the character of the experience itself. It is fundamentally incommensurable with
propositional claims in the same way that all religious truths are incommensurable with ordinary language. My god is never "like" your god. It is either wholly
the same or wholly different. One either falls within the experience of the sacred
or one does not. The mutual experience of the self-evidence of the sacred leads to
the reciprocal acknowledgement of the pledge.
Id. (footnote omitted).
74. See Eugene Garver, Saying What Goes Without Saying: Bacon's Essays on Speech,
Intelligence and Morality, in RHETORIC AND PLURALISM: LEGACIES OF WAYNE BOOTH 211
(Fred Antczak ed., 1994). Both epideixis and apodeixis can appeal to self-evident truths,
unlike the probabilities that occupy most of rhetoric.
75. ARIsTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. I, at 28, 30.
76. See W. ROBERT CONNOR, THUCYDIDES 82-83 (1984).
77. See id. There is another difference between epideictic and both deliberative and
judicial rhetoric. Deliberative and judicial rhetoric are Aristotelian species. Epideixis, on
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Because of the ways in which epideixis takes over for an inactive
deliberative faculty, it is easy to denigrate as magical thinking the
illusion that we are acting when we are only talking about acting. But
epideictic rhetoric has powers of its own worth cultivating and respecting
even as we impute failures of contemporary political conversation to its
dominance. The Emancipation Proclamation freed no slaves. It declared
free those it could do nothing about, a perfect example of the right words
giving the illusion of action. But the power of the Emancipation
Proclamation should not be measured by the number of slaves it freed
or even the number it declared free. It proclaimed a new orientation of
the political community by definitively offering a new set of values that
became the ends towards which we now calculate means in deliberation
about conducting the war. Epideictic rhetoric at its best is a powerful
force.
III.

DELIBERATION Vs. EPIDEICTIC RHETORIC AS COMPREHENSIVE
FORMS OF THE IMAGINATION: MACHIAVELLI AS MODEL

So far I have tried to diagnose our current predicament by appealing
to the language of Aristotle's Rhetoric. But my argument to this point
only shows why two modes of practical reasoning fail to come to terms
with each other. It does not account for the passions involved. It does
not explain why, as Socrates says in the Euthyphro, these disagreements
cause enmity and hatred. And it certainly does not show what the
alternatives could be to such emotional heat.
The relations between practitioners of deliberative and epideictic
rhetoric have become poisoned, and it is hard to imagine a way out. The
best we can do is to learn from examples of successful negotiation
between the two kinds of politics, always aware that any example will
be contestable. Machiavelli dramatizes the conflict between these two
modes of practical thinking and shows how someone can engage in a
comprehensive politics that includes the incommensurable visions of
policy and symbolism." Virttz means both the power to overcome
the other hand, looks like a bag for dumping all the instances of rhetoric that do not fit into
the other two kinds. While there is an important way in which epideictic rhetoric is a kind
alongside the other two, there is another way in which this criticism of the Rhetoric is
justified. Different instances of deliberation can become part of a larger deliberative whole.
We gradually make practical progress. Similarly, different instances of judicial rhetoric
can be part of a larger whole; that is how common law grows through precedent. But
different examples of epideictic rhetoric never add up. Each instance is an interruption of
history. Thus, a constant noise about death panels is replaced by a constant noise about
deficits. For a more detailed consideration of the kinds of rhetoric, see my article Eugene
Garver, Aristotle on the Kinds of Rhetoric, 27 RHETORICA 1 (2009).
78. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12.
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practical obstacles and the virtuosity of an entertaining performance. To
the policy-maker, fortuna is chance, incalculable and unpredictable
variations that one can fortify oneself against, using foresight to build
dams against floods at times before floods actually threaten. But then
Machiavelli changes the metaphor, and fortuna becomes personified as
a woman who can be dominated and seduced."
The Princeannounces itself as teaching its audience how to deliberate
through examining the great examples of the past and present. Early
on in The Prince, Machiavelli disabuses the reader of any idea that the
difference between deliberative and epideictic politics is reducible to the
difference between politics and religion, even though religion provides
the politicians with the most powerful of symbols. Moses is one of the
paradigms of virtis in Chapter 6, but Machiavelli sets aside his religious
leadership: "And although one should not reason about Moses, as he was
a mere executor of things that had been ordered for him by God,
nonetheless he should be admired if only for that grace which made him
deserving of speaking with God."so Moses acted no different from Cyrus,
Romulus, and Theseus. Note the complex interrelation between the uses
of force and of symbols, which culminates in the prince being able to
force his subjects to believe:
It is however necessary, if one wants to discuss this aspect well, to
examine whether these innovators stand by themselves or depend on
others; that is, whether to carry out their deed they must beg or indeed
can use force. In the first case they always come to ill and never
accomplish anything; but when they depend on their own and are able
to use force, then it is that they are rarely in peril. From this it arises
that all the armed prophets conquered and the unarmed ones were
ruined. For, besides the things that have been said, the nature of
peoples is variable; and it is easy to persuade them of something, but
difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And thus things must be
ordered in such a mode that when they no longer believe, one can
make them believe by force.a'
On the one hand, the lesson Machiavelli draws concerning Moses and
the others is straightforwardly pragmatic: regardless of the grace of God
that chose Moses, arms are the foundation of victory. On the other, the
prince is supposed to imitate Moses, who, in addition to founding a state,
was chosen by God and hence remembered as quite a bit more than a
military leader.

79. Id. at 98-99.
80. Id. at 22.
81. Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
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Reading The Prince offers a method for facing practical problems
without the distractions of traditional morality. The Prince reminds us
that this is not the first time people have worried that the skills needed
for someone to achieve political office are in conflict with those needed
to govern. The aspiring new prince finds himself in just the sort of
predicament that at the beginning I attributed to our condition:
circumstances are so constrained that deliberation seems impossible.
Any situation unstable enough to open up the possibility that someone
could seize power is almost guaranteed to be a situation in which the
new prince cannot be secure. In addition, people are constrained by a
morality that is practically self-defeating.
Machiavelli seems to find a little room for deliberation as he insists
that the new prince should rely on his own resources, meager as they
are, instead of becoming dependent on others. As the argument
proceeds, the range of deliberation expands until the new prince will be
"more secure and steady in his state than if he had grown old in it."'
Machiavelli creates space for deliberation by making ambiguous all the
distinctions that made deliberation impossible-new vs. old principalities,
virt&vs. fortuna, virt&vs. villainy, generosity vs. stinginess, constancy
vs. betrayal, and, ultimately, principality vs. republic. From being
impractical constraints, the standards of traditional morality become an
additional resource to be exploited."
But the practical success Machiavelli offers is not enough. The prince
has to look like a prince, and has to persuade his audience that he is
acting like a prince, not a usurper. He needs to turn the eyes of the
people towards him, so that his great deeds produce glory, even when
they are not, by more pragmatic measures, successful. The two visions
of politics-aiming at stability and aiming at glory, tracking deliberative
and symbolic politics-are combined in Machiavelli's own dramatic
performance and not in any theoretical resolution.
There are moments in The Prince where Machiavelli teaches a pure
method of deliberation, and others when it is a pure method of display.
The two extremes are nicely situated at the turning point of the
book-the shift from the first eleven chapters, which are supposed to be
about how to act in each particular kind of state, and the rest, which

82. Id. at 96.
83. See Eugene Garver, Paradigmsand Princes, 17 PHIL. Soc. SCd. 21, 21-47 (1987);
Eugene Garver, Arguing Over Incommensurable Values: The Case of Machiavelli, in THE
RHETRICAL TuRN 187 (Herbert W. Simons ed., 1990); Eugene Garver, Machiavelli:
Rhetoric, Prudence, in SEEKING REAL TRUTHS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
MACHIAVELLI 103, 103-19 (Patricia Vilches et al eds., 2007).

830

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

concern general methods." Most notably, the discussion of the prince
as a military leader shows how to learn tactical lessons from history and
act relying on one's own power alone. The trouble with mercenaries is
that using them puts one's destiny outside one's own control. Whether
they win or lose, you will lose by employing them, recalling the lines I
quoted from Chapter 6. But his discussion of military strategy in
Chapters 12-14 only highlights the degree to which the rest of The
Prince engages in a performative politics that goes far beyond the
methodical.
The other extreme comes one chapter earlier in his discussion of the
papacy and ecclesiastical states in Chapter 11. A pope practices nothing
but symbolic politics. His skill consists in nothing but the arts of
appearance without any powerful reality behind it:
[EIcclesiastical principalities ... are sustained by orders that have
grown old with religion, which have been so powerful and of such a
kind that they keep their princes in the state however they proceed
and live. These alone have states, and do not defend them; they have
subjects, and do not govern them; the subjects, though ungoverned, do
not care, and they neither think of becoming estranged from such
princes nor can they. Thus, only these principalities are secure and
happy. But as they subsist by superior causes, to which the human
mind does not reach, I will omit speaking of them; for since they are
exalted and maintained by God, it would be the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to discourse on them.?
The prince has to be successful both in reality and in appearance,
combining the arts of strategy and performance, as Moses did.
For a new prince is observed much more in his actions than a
hereditary one; and when they are recognized as virtuous, they take
hold of men much more and obligate them much more than ancient
blood. For men are much more taken by the present things than by
past ones, and when they find good in the present, they enjoy it and do
not seek elsewhere; indeed they will take up every defense on behalf
of a new prince if he is not lacking in other things as regards himself

And so he will have the double glory of having made the beginning of

84. Chapter 12 begins as follows:
Having discoursed in particular on all the qualities of those principalities which
at the beginning I proposed to reason about, having considered in some part the
causes of their well-being and ill-being, and having shown the modes in which
many have sought to acquire and hold them, it remains for me now to discourse
generally on the offense and defense befitting each of those named.
MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12, at 48.

85. Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
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a new principality, of having adorned it and consolidated it with good
laws, good arms, good friends, and good examples, just as he has a
double shame who, having been born prince, has lost it through his
lack of prudence.'
Someone who tries to live through deliberative reason alone cannot
command loyalty, and his rule will therefore be unstable since every act
will be judged by its success or failure. It is much better to be judged by
character, as people do in epideictic rhetoric.
I offer The Prince as an example because it cannot be a model to
imitate. We are not going to solve our own problems by doing what
Machiavelli did or what he told the prince to do. It is a stimulus to
reflection rather than a blueprint for action. It is an appropriate
example, more profoundly, because it is ultimately ambiguous. I have
said that the oddity of epideictic rhetoric is that it often looks like a
substitute for action rather than a preparation. To think of the
argument of The Prince as an achievement, as I have done, is to locate
practical success in the saying rather than in some doing it leads to.
The Princecould then be an example of the kind of academic discourse
Collingwood sneers about." Machiavelli undercuts that interpretation
in the final chapter, where he says that if the prince learns the lessons
he has presented, he will be able to unify Italy." The Prince ends,
then, by announcing that it will be successful not if Machiavelli has
presented a persuasive argument but if the prince succeeds in deed.
Machiavelli offers another advantage. It would be easy to infer from
my argument that we have moved from deliberative to epideictic rhetoric
because deliberation is hard, and epideixis is easy. Figuring out what
to do is difficult; finding someone to blame is simple. The deliberator
actually has to understand economics, albeit not as the professional
economist does, while the epideictic speaker trying to establish
community rather than solve problems can rely on simple analogies
between the finances of the state and of the family and stock-figures
such as the family farmer and the job-creating small businessman. But
epideixis faces its own challenges. The very lack of constraint by the
facts means that the epideictic speaker confronts a situation of
persuasion less determinate than the other kinds of rhetoric. Deliberative and judicial rhetoric, for example, call for a decision and action at
a particular time. The achievements of epideictic rhetoric are less
urgent but more lasting, thus glory is more demanding for the prince
than victory. Military victory, formed through strategy, is unstable
86. Id. at 96 (footnote omitted).
87.

See COLLINGWOOD, supra note 32.

88. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 12, at 101.

832

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

relative to the construction of a princely appearance through the prince
displaying himself as a prince.
Earlier I noted that the open-mindedness of deliberation creates a
problem: if nothing is sacred, then there still have to be external limits
on our calculations, or else we might find slavery or establishing a
national church open to discussion. Here again, I think Machiavelli
offers some guidance. He rejects the external constraints imposed on
deliberation by traditional morality. He will replace its indifference to
consequences with his own effective truth. The traditional virtues and
vices are nothing but hindrances to clear-eyed strategic thinking. The
man of virt6 is completely flexible and will change as circumstances
demand. However, Machiavelli eventually finds some categorical
restraints within the prince's rhetorical universe. Fear and love are
sometimes useful emotions to invoke, and sometimes should be avoided.
But being hated, despised, and held in contempt is always a bad thing.
IV.

CAN WE Do BETTER?

I have claimed that the reason the epideictic rhetoric of identity
politics and community solidarity is so popular is that we do not think
we are in a position to deliberate. I have made it sound like epideictic
is an easier mode of speech, a fall-back position to which we retreat
when the contingencies and dangers of a situation become too hard to
face. When I was a graduate student, I played handball. During that
time, racquetball was invented, and its popularity made handball into
an endangered sport. Racquetball was far easier and so had wider
appeal. So it is with deliberative and epideictic rhetoric.
But every sport played on a sufficiently high level is fully engaging
and demanding. And the same goes for the kinds of rhetoric. There is
nothing inherently second-rate about epideictic rhetoric. It may be
easier to practice badly than deliberative rhetoric, but just as hard to
practice well. The rhetoric of identity politics, so often today practiced
on the cheap, can transform a community. Consider the famous lines
from Lincoln's first inaugural address:89 "We are not enemies, but
friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained
it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory
... will yet swell ... when again touched, as surely they will be, by the
better angels of our nature."o Deliberative rhetoric could determine

89. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH
1989, at 133 (1989).
90. Id. at 141.
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how to win the Civil War, but Lincoln deployed epideixis first to try to
prevent the war, and then, in his second inaugural address, to end it
with reconciliation. Those are noble and difficult tasks that show some
of the potential of epideictic rhetoric. Epideictic rhetoric is not
necessarily a fall-back position taken when deliberation is too hard, as
I argue it is in current conditions.
In particular, thinking about epideictic rhetoric helps us to understand
the asymmetries I noted at the beginning, that many of our disputes
involve matters that are crucial to one person's identity yet seem trivial
to another-whether wearing a yarmulke will destroy military morale,
whether the rest of us should worry that some products we buy in the
grocery store have been certified as Halal, and whether burning a flag
or nude dancing conveys a message. "[Aimplification is most proper to
epideictic [rhetoric] ... past fact [is most proper] to judicial . . . and
possibility and future fact [are most proper] to deliberative speeches."'
Epideictic oratory most of all uses amplification, arguments that make
something seem large or small. To make something into a preference is
to diminish it; to make something into a matter of principle is to
maximize its significance. The times we seem most to be speaking past
each other are the times we are making something large or small,
crucial or trivial. Seen in this light, epideictic rhetoric is far from an
easy fallback when deliberation is too hard. Understanding arguments
about the right size of things could help us to understand each other
when such recognition seems least likely.92

91. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, bk. II, at 174 (fourth and sixth alterations in original).
92. This paper benefitted from a very stimulating discussion of its oral presentation,
along with the other papers and events at Mercer University Law School. In addition to
the named participants, I was asked very penetrating questions from people in the
audience whose names I never even learned. I am grateful to the exceptional hospitality
surrounding the event.
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